Much ado has been made recently over Ukraine’s prospects of EU accession. Any subtle hint of the possible expansion of cooperation with the European Union is interpreted by Ukrainian officials as a major breakthrough toward full EU membership.
However, high ranking officials of the European Commission and representatives of the old EU msember states (“old Europe”) have their own interpretation of the situation. They immediately refute such statements and insist that, in the next ten years or even longer, Ukraine’s EU integration is impossible.
As a matter of fact, there is little point in speculating about Europe’s true attitude toward Ukraine. It is better to review actual examples of Ukraine-EU relations. Maybe it is time to put forward arguments that would enable us at least to minimize our losses, — or even more, lead to a dialogue with Europe as equals…
Common truths
While breaking lances over Ukraine’s joining or not joining the EU, Ukrainian experts and officials only roughly outline its major goal. This goal is positive economic effect, which could be appreciated by every Ukrainian. I am not referring to immediate increase in minimal wages up to a certain virtual quantity which governments, say in Great Britain or France, allegedly force employers to pay to their workers.
In pragmatic terms, the positive economic effect of a higher degree of cooperation with the EU should be revealed through the achievement of two major goals.
In the short term, it is the improvement of access for major Ukrainian exports (the products of metallurgy, metal-working, chemistry, textile and, to a certain extent, agriculture) to the global European market.
In the mid-to-long term, it is the attraction of investment, technology and know-how in order to change the production structure. This structure is currently dominated by products with low manufacturing processing, and is hampered by the limited access of Ukrainian producers to the world markets thanks to restrictive EU tools and mechanisms.
The improvement of Ukrainian living standards is only possible as a result of the improvement of the market position of every individual Ukrainian enterprise.
These are common economic truths. However, Ukrainian officials do not attach due importance to them. Yet, the actions of all European politicians and officials are based on them. Even while sending friendly “messages” to Ukraine, the Europeans will keep on protecting their market with the tools that are sometimes not very pleasant for us.
Tubing “non grata”
To understand better the attitude of the EU to Ukraine in the sphere of trade, let us remember the fact that, during the last two or three years, the EU was gradually becoming a “state” (in terms of a single foreign policy), which initiated the largest quantity of investigations into dumping charges.
In the mid-to-late 1990s, the EU was the world’s leader in investigations into dumping charges. At the beginning of the new century, it yielded this title to the USA, but last year the EU restored its status of the “world’s trade police.” In 2005, 24 anti-dumping investigations were lunched in the EU, which was twice as many as in the USA.
An anti-dumping investigation into the case oseamless tube imports to the EU, started by the European Commission in March 2005, is one of the most illustrative examples of the perseverance of EU in the protection of its market. The investigation will soon come to an end and result in new anti-dumping dues on Ukrainian tube products.
This is a very old story. An anti-dumping investigation into the import of seamless tubes from Russia, Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia was launched in 1996. In one year, it resulted in anti-dumping dues on products from those countries.
Similar investigations were launched based on charges against Ukraine and Croatia in 1998.
At the first stage of this anti-dumping “spiral,” the European Commission maintained certain parity between imports from all of the above states.
Another issue that stood apart and was criticized by the Ukrainian side, was the rejection of market economy status to Ukraine. As a result, significantly higher anti-dumping dues were imposed on Ukrainian products. At the same time, the European Commission let Ukraine make voluntary price and quantity commitments.
Unfortunately, when making these commitments, Ukrainians didn’t have any experience in this area. They failed to come up with the proper price formula that would bring the prices stated in its commitments in accordance with the price fluctuations on the European pipe market. By mid-2002 it was obvious that the price difference was so great that it was simply impossible to deliver products under those commitments. So Ukrainian producers recalled them, and Ukrainian tubes were imposed a 38.5% tariff.
When the European Union expanded in May 2004, anti-dumping measures were “automatically” adopted by 10 new EU members. Accordingly, Ukrainian tube producers effectively lost their traditional markets of Central and Eastern Europe. Their arguments were not heard and the European Commission remained impervious to their request for temporary customs benefits.
The events that took place starting from mid-2004 revealed a biased and discriminatory attitude toward Ukrainian tube producers. Thus, in July 2005 the European Commission suspended import dues on Russian and Romanian tubes. The EC said that there was a punitive deal between Japanese and European tube producers during the anti-dumping investigation and that market conditions could have been distorted. This, in its turn, could have influenced the calculation of the dues for Russia and Romania.
The European Commission suspended import dues on Russian and Romanian seamless tubes based on these assumptions even without any evidence (after all “could have been distorted” does not mean “were distorted”). At the same time, the official decision states that the EC cannot confirm that dumping imports from these countries no longer cause any damage to the European pipe industry.
Thus, by suspending import dues on Russian and Romanian pipes, the European Commission in fact violated European legislation.
At the same time, the EC simply ignored all arguments from the Ukrainian side; in particular, that suspension of import dues for certain countries, in violation of European legislation, discriminated against producers from other countries and would lead to replacement of some producers with the others as a result of market preferences.
Now, Ukrainian seamless carbonaceous tubes are assessed a 38.5% import tariff, while Russian and Romanian pipes are imported duty-free.
Since July 2004, such actions of the European commission have effectively forced the Ukrainian producers out of the EU seamless carbonaceous tube market and made them concentrate on the more expensive alloyed seamless tube market.
Moreover, these moves of the European Commission caused an uncontrolled increase in the supplies of Russian and Romanian carbonaceous tubes on the European market. This resulted int an anti-dumping investigation into the import of seamless tubes from Russia, Romania, Ukraine and Croatia in March 2005.
This time, the European Commission didn’t find it necessary to specify the type of tubes and determined effectively that all types of weldless tubes - both carbonaceous and alloyed - that can be supplied to the EU are subject to investigation. The basic argument for this decision was the criterion of their weldability. If the same criteria were used in relation to automobile construction, it would sound like this: Cars, motorcycles and busses are one and the same product because they all have wheels and they all can be driven.
During the assessment of tariffs as a result of damage caused by tube imports to European industry, Ukraine was assessed together with the aforementioned countries. So, Ukraine, whose supply of tubes to the EU dropped by 35% from 2002 - 2004, was place in the same category as Russia, whose supply of tubes to the EU grew by 81 % over the same period, as well as Romania and Croatia (with the growth rates of 45% and 65%, respectively). And no clear explanation was given as to why the USA and Argentina, whose supplies grew as well while prices were even lower than that of the Ukrainian producers, were not subjected to investigation.
A License for Targeting Major Producers?
During the investigation, the European Commission adjusted electricity and gas prices for Ukrainian producers despite the granting of market status to its individual enterprises and the status of market economy to Ukraine in the end of 2005. At the same time, it did not adjuste electricity prices for Russian tube producers in spite of their much lower prices.
The Commission would not listen to the arguments of Ukrainian producers that during the investigation the prices of electricity and gas in Ukraine stayed at the level of the low prices for energy sources in the EU countries.
In fact, everything was done to even out the dues for Russian and Ukrainian producers, given that the prices for the Russian tubes were much lower than for Ukraine’s on the European market.
Another tendency that became apparent during the investigation was the obvious determination of the European commission target major producers from Russian and Ukraine. Thus, enterprises supplying the EU with 75% to 80% of tube imports were imposed the highest fees.
The unwillingness of the European commission to listen to any comments from Ukrainian producers looks quite inexplicable in such a context.
For example, one of the affected producers carried out an analysis of the calculations of the European Commission and found many mistakes. The producer told the Commission about this. The company submitted a detailed description of every mistake, the analysis of its effect on the final size of the fee as well as the correct calculations based on the data the Commission used to determine the dues. As a result, the actual due made up only 9% compared to 26%. The EC ignored this data. Moreover, as if in mockery, it reduced the fee to this producer from 26% to 25%.
Nevertheless, even under such conditions, the Ukrainian tube producers, with the assistance of the government, Economics Ministry and Foreign Ministry, managed to achieve unique results in the history of EC anti-dumping investigations into Ukrainian imports. It was for the first time in the history of independent Ukraine that, at a meeting of the Anti-Dumping Consulting Committee, (which has historically approved sanctions unanimously against Ukraine), four out of its 25 members (one representative from each EC country) voted against the sanctions, while six of its members abstained from voting. At the same time the majority of the states spoke in favor of a special examination of the matter of sanctions against Ukraine.
Only the “unsporting” behavior of the European Commission prevented Ukrainian producers from protecting fully their interests. The Commission, in fact, insisted that if no sanctions against Ukraine were adopted, no sanctions against Russia, Romania, Croatia would be adopted, and consequently, European industry would suffer.
Forecasts and Consequences
What are we to expect of the anti-dumping investigation that is coming to an end in the EU?
Most likely, anti-dumping dues will be imposed on all seamless tubes imported from Ukraine to the EU countries starting from July 1, 2006. They will equal 25 - 26% for most Ukrainian producers, and will in fact obstruct the supplies of seamless tubes to the EU.
The loss incurred as a result of reducing supplies by 100 - 110 thousand tons may well exceed 100 million dollars per year. This is, of course, a major loss to the Ukrainian economy as a result of EU anti-damping sanctions against the country. In fact, the last large group of Ukrainian competitive products of a rather high manufacturing quality is being kicked out of the European market.
At the nationwide level, this will result in an increasing negative trade balance with the EU. In 2005, the negative trade balance was a record 2.2 billion dollars.
At the level of regions and individual enterprises, one can expect a decrease in the income of local budgets, dismissal of workers (more than 2 thousand people, according to the estimates of Ukrtrubprom), and salary and social insurance cuts.
It is very doubtful that, under such conditions, tube producing enterprises will be able to implement energy saving programs, vital because of energy price growth, or programs for equipment manufacturing and high technology products.
One should also realize that not only tube manufacturers will incur losses. Metallurgists, producing work parts for tubes, as well as the entire infrastructure connected with tube enterprises in Ukraine will also incur losses.
Meanwhile…
What actual measures could be taken to protect the interests of Ukrainian tube manufactures and to prevent further discriminatory actions of the governments of other states?
Ukraine should fight until the last gasp for the interests of its producers, and Yuriy Yekhanurov and Arseniy Yatsenyuk should be supported in their efforts.
We should conduct an investigation in line with Article 29 of the Law of Ukraine On Foreign Economic Activities to reveal discrimination against Ukrainian products by the European Commission during its anti-dumping investigation into import of seamless tubes. Should such facts be found, the Ukrainian side has the right to impose special anti-discriminatory sanctions on EU imports in an amount similar to tariffs imposed on Ukraine.
Even after such sanctions, Ukraine would have the right to dispute them within the WTO framework by applying to a special body for settlement of trade disputes (pseudo arbitration).
Unfortunately, a lawsuit is very unlikely in terms of changing current sanctions. The shortest trial of such a trade case in the European Court was 49 months, while on average such a procedure takes more than 60 months (five years). Thus, anti-dumping dues would expire earlier than the court passes its final verdict.
Even Russia, whose relations with Ukraine are currently rather strained, was fairer to Ukraine and maintained access for Ukrainian tubes to the Russian market within the framework of the anti-dumping investigation. Note that Ukrainian tube manufactures are direct competitors of Russian manufactures.
The EU supports Ukraine in word, yet it has effectively eliminated access for Ukrainian tubes to the European market, in which European industry traditionally does not operate. This market has always been, and will always be, satisfied with the products of third states.
The ban on supplies of Ukrainian products to the European market will result in the entry of cheap Chinese tubes to the EU. It will also lead to an increase in imports of Russian products thanks to both the low prices of these products, which are lower than Ukraine’s, and to artificial restriction of the competition.
In fact, the European Commission preferred the manufactures of other states to Ukraine’s without any sufficient grounds, even thought it uses the slogan of protection of its own manufactures as a cover.
Tags: Macroeconomics by Vitaliy Tretyakov
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